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[KogyBear]

Operation Linebacker II, The Twelve Days of Christmas.
-K. Bear-

The single most intensive, and the most effective, use of air power in the world’s history is probably also the most overlooked by the general public.  In the twelve days (eleven days of actual offensive operations) between 18 and 29 December 1972, the USAF Strategic Air Command’s 43rd Bombardment Wing (BW), 307th Strategic Wing (SW) and 72nd Strategic Wing (Provisional) destroyed just about every high value target in the Hanoi and Haiphong area.  By the eleventh and last day, not only were the high value targets rubble, most of the North’s available Surface-to-air missiles (SAM) were expended, or destroyed, with but a trickle of replacements inbound from China.  As a testament to the training and professionalism of these crews, none of the mission had the benefit of a rehearsal, due to the compression of the flight schedule, and target planning time required, many crews during the first few days were given their target information just prior to take-off.  Until 1982, these were the longest aerial combat missions ever flown in both duration and distance.  Even today they remain the longest combat missions consisting of a large formation of bombers, probably never to equaled or surpassed.

This was, in my opinion, the greatest moment in the history of US air power.  During the eleven days of bombing, not only did the three Strategic Wings, launch strikes against the North, the USAF Tactical Air Command, US Navy and Marine Corps launched not only 100 or more sorties each night in direct combat support of the heavies, (and as many refueling sorties and indirect airborne support sorties) they launched as many if not more day-attack missions before the BUFFs came through in the night.  This was truly a “maximum effort.”

Combat Tactics

The basic organization of a major strike in the high threat airspace over the Hanoi/Haiphong area had evolved in the years since the beginning of Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965.  The basic elements and their timing over the target area would be similar, whether a day precision strike of LGB loaded F-4s or a night massed B-52 strike.

The first aircraft into the target area were the chaff dispensing F-4s, eight of which equipped with the AN/ALE-38 Chaff Dispensing Pod could lay down a chaff corridor about 5 miles wide and 100 miles long.  This was long enough to allow the entire ingress and egress route to be protected.  The chaff flights were escorted by one or two flights of air-to-air configured F-4s.  The escorting F-4s would, over the target, break off from chaff escort and take up blocking positions in between the bomber approach corridor and any operational air fields, or fan out to hunt and engage enemy aircraft (BARCAP or MIGCAP), while the chaff dispensers continued to lay chaff down the egress corridor.  If required, additional F-4s would be assigned to take up CAP orbits over and around the target area.

The next aircraft into the target area would be the SAM suppression flights, either F-105Gs or F-4s.  Two differing tactics were used in the suppression of SAMs.  The first was the Iron Hand missions, which were to attack active radar sites with AGM-45 Shrike or AGM-78 Standard Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARM).  This was not as effective as was hoped, as the radar operators displayed good transmission discipline either switching off the transmitter causing the missile to lose guidance, or not turning on the transmitter and shoot SAMs passively, aiming for the center of a Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) noise blossom, this was reasonably effective against the non-maneuvering B-52s. The second tactic was the Hunter-Killer concept, F-4s were tasked to accompany the F-105s and drop CBU-52 cluster bombs on and around known active sites.  The F-4s were also armed with AIM-9s and could, if required, jettison ordnance and perform MIGCAP roles.  The timing of the Iron Hand was crucial, if they arrived to early, their fuel would be exhausted before the bombers arrived, too late, they would be unable to engage the air defenses effectively enough to protect the bombers.

The standard B-52 formation used was the bomber stream of two or more three-ship cells, each cell was to follow the lead cell at two to three minute intervals (approximately 25 miles).  Within the cell aircraft followed each other spaced at 15 seconds (theoretically, 2 nautical miles) with number 2 approximately 1000 feet higher than number 1 and number 3 1000 feet higher than number 2.  This was done to maximize the ECM defensive coverage.  Generally, the bomber stream was accompanied by a close escort of one or two flights of F-4s.  During the mission the upper beacon lights were turned on to allow identification of the bomber stream by the escort aircraft, as well as, allow visual cue for formation keeping within the cell.

Additional F-4s were tasked with providing escort to the tankers, airborne radar and stand-off ECM assets.

Tanker support was staged over northern Thailand (three tracks) and off the coast of Vietnam (two tracks) for Thailand and South Vietnam based aircraft and further out in the Pacific for the Guam based B-52s.

ECM stand-off jamming aircraft, EB-66s, flew in racetrack orbits to the just inside North Vietnam to the southwest of Hanoi, distanced just outside the high threat SAM area.

Teaball Weapons Control Center was the command and control facility at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.  Teaball was the combination of operation management and real-time intelligence dissemination, brought about by deficiencies noted in May 1972 during the initial phases of Linebacker I.  Teaball WCC received input from several airborne platforms, OLYMPIC TORCH (U-2 flights over the Gulf of Tonkin - signal intelligence, SIGINT), COMBAT APPLE (RC-135M flight over the Gulf of Tonkin - SIGINT and electronic intelligence, ELINT), BURING PIPE (RC-135C flights over Laos - SIGINT and ELINT), BIG LOOK (USN EC-121M flights over the Gulf of Tonkin - AEW) and DISCO (USAF EC-121 flights over northern Loas - AEW) as well as RED CROWN (US Navy radar picket off the coast of North Vietnam) to put together an accurate picture of what the North Vietnamese had in the air and where it was heading.  Control information from Teaball was relayed on a discrete frequency to LUZON (KC-135 over the Gulf of Tonkin - communication relay) where it rebroadcast on the MIGCAP, escort or strike force frequencies.

By October 1972, most of the communication bugs and information lags were minimized or eliminated.  The ability to track enemy aircraft, even below 10,000 feet, (which was the lower limit for Red Crown, Disco and Big Look) allow for improved kill ratios towards the end of the Linebacker I campaign, and into the Linebacker II campaign.

Forces Available

Strategic Air Command assets in theater:
54   B-52D Stratofortress   U-Tapao RTNAB, Thailand    307th Strategic Wing
53    KC-135 Stratotanker   U-Tapao RTNAB, Thailand    307th Strategic Wing - Provosional
10    KC-135 Stratotanker   Takhli RTAFB, Thailand    11th ARS / 310th Strategic Wing - Provosional
53    B-52G Stratofortress   Andersen AFB, Guam    43rd Bombardment Wing
99    B-52G Stratofortress   Andersen AFB, Guam    72nd Strategic Wing - Provisional
59    KC-135A Stratotanker    Kadena AB, Okinawa    376th Strategic Wing
7    KC-135A Stratotanker    Kadena AB Okinawa    Combat Lightning - Radio relay
5    KC-135Q Stratotanker   Kadena AB, Okinawa    376th/909th AREFS
6    KC-135Q Stratotanker   Kadena AB, Okinawa    456th Bombardment Wing
12    KC-135Q Stratotanker   Kadena AB, Okinawa    306th AREFS
4    SR-71    Kadena AB Okinawa    “Giant Bear” Reconnaissance, 9th SRW
(?)    RC-135M    Kandena AB, Okinawa    376th/82nd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron - ELINT
25    KC-135A Stratotanker   Clark AB Philippines    376th Strategic Wing
2    U-2R    U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand   99th SRS, 9th SRW
2    DC-130 Hercules   U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand   99th SRS, 9th SRW

Tactical Air Command assets in theater:
48   F-111A Aardvark    Takhi RTAFB, Thailand   428th, 429th & 430th TFS / 474th TFW (all NA tail code)
49    F-4C/D Pahntom II   Udorn RTAFB, Thailand   13th TFS (F-4 C/D - OC) & 555th TFS (F-4D - OY) / 432nd TRW
18    RF-4C Pahntom II   Udorn RTAFB, Thailand   14th TRS (OZ) / 432nd TRW
16    F-4C Pahntom II   Korat RTAFB, Thailand    67th TFS (ZG) / 388th TFW
24    F-4E Pahntom II    Korat RTAFB, Thailand    34th (JJ) & 44th (JE) TFS / 388th TFW
23    F-105G Thunderchief   Korat RTAFB, Thailand    17th Wild Weasel Squadron (JB) / 388th TFW
17    EB-66 Destroyer    Korat RTAFB, Thailand    42nd TEWS (JC) / 388th TFW
7   EC-130E Hercules   Korat RTAFB, Thailand   7th ACCS / 388th TFW (JC)
72    A-7D Cousair II   Korat RTAFB, Thailand   353rd, 354th, 355th & 356th TFS / 354th TFW (all MB)
(10)    HC-130P Hercules   Korat RTAFB, Thailand    56th ARRS (no tail code)
7    EC-121D Warning Star   Korat RTAFB, Thailand    Det1 522nd AEWCW (no tail code)
111    F-4D/E Pahntom II   Ubon RTAFB, Thailand   433rd (FG), 497th (FP) and 25th (FA) TFS / 8th TFW (all F-4C/D)
         334th, 335th & 336th TFS / 4th TFW (all F-4E -  SJ)
         308th TFS / 31st TFW (F-4E - ZF)
(14)    HH-53   Nakhon Phanom RTNAB, Thailand
         40th ARRS (no tail code)

US Naval Air assets available:
CVW 2   (NE)   USS Ranger (CVA-61)   
   VF-21   F-4J Phanton II
   VF-154   F-4J Phanton II
   VA-25   A-7E Corsair II
   VA-113   A-7E Corsair II
   VA-145   A-6A & B, KA-6D
   VAW-111 Det 1   E-1B Tracer
   VAQ- 130 Det 4   EKA-3B Skywarrior
   VQ-1 Det   EA-6B Prowler
   RVAH-5    RA-5C Vigilante
   HC-1 Det 4   SH-3G Sea King
   HC-7 Det 110   HH-3A Sea King

CVW 3   (AC)   USS Saratoga (CVA-60)   
   VF-31   F-4J Phanton II
   VF-103   F-4J Phanton II
   VA-37   A-7A Corsair II
   VA-105   A-7A Corsair II
   VA-75   A-6A & B, KA-6D
   VAW-123   E-2B Hawkeye
   VMCJ-2 Det   EA-6B Prowler
   RVAH-1    RA-5C Vigilante
   HC-7   SH-3G Sea King
   HC-7 Det 10   HH-3A Sea King

CVW 5   (NF)   USS Midway (CVA-41)   
   VF-151   F-4B Phanton II
   VF-161   F-4B Phanton II
   VA-56   A-7B Corsair II
   VA-93   A-7B Corsair II
   VA-115   A-6A & B, KA-6D
   VAQ-130 Det 2   EKA-3B Skywarrior
   VFP-63 Det 3   RF-8G Crusader
   VAW-115    E-2B Hawkeye
   HC-1 Det 2   SH-3G Sea King
   HC-7 Det 110   HH-3A Sea King

CVW 8   (AJ)   USS America (CVA-66)   
   VF-74   F-4J Phanton II
   VMFA-333   F-4J Phanton II
   VA-82   A-7C Corsair II
   VA-86   A-7C Corsair II
   VA-35   A-6A & B, KA-6D
   VAW-124   E-2B hawkeye
   RVAH-6    RA-5C Vigilante
   HC-2   SH-3G Sea King
   HC-7 Det 110   HH-3A Sea King

CVW 14   (NK)    USS Enterprise (CVAN-65)   
   VF-143   F-4J Phanton II
   VF-142   F-4J Phanton II
   VA-27   A-7E Corsair II
   VA-97   A-7E Corsair II
   VA-196   A-6A & B, KA-6D
   VAW-113   E-2B hawkeye
   VAQ-131   EA-6B prowler
   RVAH-13   RA-5C Vigilante
   HC-2 Det 1   SH-3G Sea King

CVW 19   (NM)   USS Oriskany (CVA-34)   
   VF-191   F-8J Crusader
   VF-194   F-8J Crusader
   VA-153   A-7A Corsair II
   VA-155   A-7B Corsair II
   VA-215   A-7B Corsair II
   VFP-63 Det 4   RF-8G Grusader
   VAW-130 Det 3   EKA-3B Skywarrior
   VAW-111 Det 6    E-1B Tracer
   HC-1 Det 5   SH-3G Sea King

Nominal strength of a fighter or attack squadron was 12 to 14 aircraft, Electronic Warfare squadrons and Reconnaissance/Photographic squadrons 2 to 4 aircraft, giving a total of 60 to 70 fixed wing assets and another dozen or so rotary wing assets.

In addition there were 27 USMC F-4Bs at Nam Phong RTAFB, Thailand available for tasking.

The B-52D was modified with the “big belly” conversion allowing 84 bombs to be carried internally and an additional 24 external for a total of 108, as opposed to the B-52G, which only had attachment points for 27 bombs internally and did not use the underwing pylons.  A factor that would come into play later in the campaign, but not initially addressed was only half the B-52Gs fleet stationed at Andersen AFB had undergone the ECM Phase V upgrade (also known as Rivet Rambler).

Further naval support came in the form of the USS Long Beach cruising thirty miles off the coast.  Her powerful radar assisted in monitoring the crowded airspace over North Vietnam, providing some intercept information to CAP aircraft and the seemingly constant, “SAM launch, SAM launch, vicinity Hanoi/Haiphong/Vihn,” threat warnings to the US attack aircraft.

[KogyBear]

The Mission

On December 13th 1972 the North Vietnamese peace delegation walked out and refused to return until the subject of POW and their withdrawal from the South Vietnam were dropped from the agenda.  The objectives of Linebacker II were two-fold, one, to bring the North Vietnamese negotiators back to the table in Paris, and two, destroy the ability of the North Vietnamese to sustain military activity in the South.  The first objective was especially dire as President Nixon was under intense pressure from Congress to accept a unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam, and was threatening to cut operational funding altogether.  This would have left the fate of all US prisoners currently held in North Vietnam in question, not to mention the fate of the entire country of South Vietnam. 

The timing of the NVN walkout was , in some ways, fortuitous for Nixon as Congress was in their Christmas recess and this gave Nixon a free hand; at least until the new year.  If the NVN could not be brought back the negotiation table before Congress re-convened in January 1973, Nixon’s idea of “Peace with Honor” was pretty much gone.

On the 15th of December, President Nixon presented Hanoi with an ultimatum to return to Paris for serious negotiations within seventy two hours “or else”.  At the same time the warning orders for a “Maximum Effort” against Hanoi were sent to units in the Southeast Asia Theater of operations.

Prelude

On the 17th of December 1972 teletype machines in the headquarters around Southeast Asia began to chatter away.  At the direction of the President of the United States, the following orders were sent out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCSAC, CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and the 8th Air Force (Strategic Air Command), 13th Air Force (Pacific Air Force) and units at Andersen, Kadena, Clark, U-Tapao, Udorn, Takli, Korat and other air bases in the western Pacific:

YOU ARE DIRECTED TO COMMENCE AT APPROXIMATELY 1300Z ON 18 DEC 1972 A THREE DAY MAXIMUM EFFORT // REPEAT MAXIMUM EFFORT // OF B-52 // TACAIR STRIKES IN THE HANOI // HAIPHONG AREAS AGAINST TARGET CONTAINED IN THE AUTHORIZED TARGET LIST . . . BE PREPARED TO EXTEND OPERATIONS PAST THREE DAYS IF DIRECTED.  THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS APPLY:
A. UTILIZE VISUAL AS WELL AS ALL WEATHER CAPABILITIES.
B. UTILIZE ALL RESOURCES WHICH CAN BE SPARED WITHOUT CRITICAL DETRIMENT TO OPERATIONS IN RUN AND SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS IN CAMBODIA.
C. UTILIZE RESTRIKES ON AUTHORIZED TARGETS, AS NECESSARY.  NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR ORDER OF BATTLE, AIRFIELDS, AND ACTIVE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES MAY BE STRUCK AS TACTICAL SITUATION DICTATES TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF ATTACK FORCES AND MINIMIZE LOSSES.
D. EXERCISE PRECAUTION TO MINIMIZE RISK TO CIVILIAN CAUSALITIES UTILIZING LGB [LASER GUIDED BOMBS] WEAPONS AGAINST DESIGNATED TARGETS.  AVOID DAMAGE TO THIRD COUNTRY SHIPPING.”

“Or Else…” Day One (Monday, 18 December 1972)

The plan of attack was ambitious, three waves of B-52 would stream over the Hanoi area, with each three ship cell dropping bombs every 2 minutes for thirty minutes each.  At 15 minutes before 8:00 pm (1300Z) the bombing would start Hoa Lac air field with 6 B-52s, then Kep air field with 9, then Phuc Yen air field with 6, then the Kinh No complex would be bombed by 18 aircraft, and the final attack of wave I would be 9 bombers hitting Yen Vien complex.  Wave II would start four hours later and follow a similar pattern.  At 4 minutes past midnight (1704Z, still the 18th) the Gia Lam rail yard was targeted by 6 B-52s, then 18 bombers to Yen Vien complex for a second time, and 6 bombers hitting Hinh No, again.  Wave III would follow after almost 4 hours, the first target Hanoi radio at 03:50 am (2150Z) with 21 bombers, Gia Lam again with 18 bombers this time, and Kinh No for the third time with 12 B-52s.  A total of 54 B-52Gs and 33 B-52Ds were launched from Guam and 42 additional B-52Ds took off from U-Tapao, for a total of 129 bombers.  This airborne force carried 9558 bombs, over 4.5 million pounds of ordnance.

In support of the nights bombings, Wave I would have 5 F-105G and 4 F-4Cs for SAM suppression, 20 escort/CAP fighters and 4 chaff bombers.  Wave II would have 8 F-105Gs, 20 escorts/CAP and 10 chaff bombers, Wave II I would have 9 Navy A-7 for SAM suppression, 23 Escorts/CAP and 8 chaff flights.

In addition to the heavy bombers, there were also 8 F-111A sorties against Yen Bai air field, Hoa Lac air field, Phuc Yen air field, prior to Wave I, 7 F-111 sorties on Lang Truoc Radar station, Bac Mai air field, the Hanoi Port facilities, Hanoi’s transformer station and Bac Giang electrical power plant between Wave I and II.  In addition, Navy and Marine Corps aviation launched 34 A-6 Intruder sorties in support of the nights activities.

At nine minutes before 3:00 pm local time at Andersen AFB Guam (0415Z) the first of twenty-seven B-52s rolled down the runway Andersen AFB, Guam to begin the 7 hour flight to one of the most well defended areas in the world at the time.  At approximately 1645 (0945Z), the remaining 21 B-52Ds of the Wave I launched at U-Tapao.
The first casualty of the operation was an F-111A (Snug 40).  It went down due to unknown causes (although, failure of the terrain following radar was suspected) after bombing Hanoi.  Lt Col Ronald J. Ward and Maj James McElvan were killed. 

Right on schedule, first of approximately six hundred-fifty bombs began to rain down on Hoa Lac airfield.  As Snow and Brown cells turned away from Hoa Lac airfield, a MiG warning was sent out that a MiG was attempting to intercept the bomber stream. In Brown 03 (B-52D 55-0676), the last bomber of the trail cell,  SSgt Samuel O. Turner picked up the closing MiG and engaged with his radar directed quad-fifties.  After about three bursts the Mig disappeared from his screen.  Another tail gunner observed the engagement and confirmed the kill.

Over Kinh No, in the second cell Lilac 03 out of Andersen AFB was hit by a SAM 20 seconds prior to weapons release, the badly damaged D model was unable to release bombs but did limp to U-Tapao to recovered safely. 

Ten minutes later at Yen Vien Charcoal 1, was hit by two SAMs just prior to bomb release and blew up, Lt Col Donald L. Rissi, 1/Lt Robert J. Thomas, and M/Sgt Walter L. Ferguson were killed in the crash.  Maj Richard E. Johnson, Capt Robert G. Certain and Capt Richard T. Simpson managed to eject from the stricken aircraft to become POWs.  This was the first B-52 lost in the Linebacker II offensive.

Wave II’s lead cell, Peach, G models out of Andersen AFB, was lead their bomber stream over Yen Ven.  Peach 02 was hit seconds after weapons release.  With the left wing damaged and #1 and #2 engine out and burning, it attempted to recover at U-Tapao, but the fire eventually consumed the entire left wing and the big bomber crashed near Nam Phong, Thailand, the seven man crew, (the Deputy Airborne Commander was aboard) safely exited the aircraft prior to break-up and were quickly picked up by Marine SAR helicopters.

During Wave II attacks Rose 01, was struck by a SAM during their Post Target Turn (PTT) and when down with Capt Richard Cooper and Sgt Charlie S. Poole; the remaining four crewmembers became the night’s second set of POWs.  A Navy A-7C (Street Car 303) was also hit by a SAM while attempting to suppress SAM activity.  Lt Carl T. Weiland ejected and was captured.

129 B-52 and fifteen F-111A sorties attacked 13 targets the first night. One B-52D and two B-52Gs were lost, with another three battle damaged.  Three more B-52Gs (Lilac 03, Aqua 02 and Red 03) could not release bombs.  All losses (except the F-111) were due to SA-2 SAMs.

Looking good - Day Two (Tuesday, 19 December 1972)

As the last of Day One B-52s recovered at Andersen AFB, Guam, the first of the next nights were preparing for launch.  93 B-52s, 28 F-111As, 28 F-4s, and 20 A-7Ds were tasked with bombing missions, and 109 combat support sorties.

Wave 1 consisted of 12 B-52Ds and 9 B-52Gs from Andersen, and were to hit Kinh No at 8:10 pm, Wave 2, 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao and 21 B-52Gs from Andersen were to hit the Bac Giang trans-shipment complex (21 aircraft) and the Hanoi radio (15 aircraft), Wave 3, 15 B-52Ds from U-Tapao, 15 B-52Ds and 6 B-52Gs from Andersen were assigned to bomb Yen Vien (9 aircraft) and Thai Nguyen Electrical power Generation Plant (27 aircraft).  The B-52s would used the similar ingress and egress routes as the night before, approaching from the southwest from Thailand, flying well north of the target, turning south for the target run and exiting on a parallel track to the ingress route but further south.  This flight path was similar to that used by F-105s attacking Hanoi during the Rolling Thunder campaign, and required a rather sharp PTT, generally the PTT was 200 to 270 degrees, which some though might degrade ECM effectiveness by placing the antenna in non-optimal attitude with respect to the enemy radar.
 
The F-111As were assigned to strike Yen Bai, Hoa Lac, Phuc Yen, Kep and Bac Giang, with the bombing commencing at approximately 8:00 pm local (1300Z).  The F-111s entered and egresses independently of one another using their high sophisticated terrain avoidance radar to maintain a 200 to 1000 foot altitude.

In support, there would be 15 F-105G and 4 F-4C SAM suppression flights, 61 escort/CAP flights and 24 chaff flights.  The Navy/USMC would provide 41 A-6 sorties, 26 A-7 sorties and 10 F-4 sorties.

USAF F-4s and A-7s were to bomb the Hanoi radio complex Yen Bai using LORAN directed bomb release during the day.  The accuracy of LORAN directed bomb drops was dismal.

SAM launches were fewer than the night before and the accuracy of the AAA was worse.  No aircraft were hit by hostile fire.

The Bottom Falls Out - Day Three (Wednesday, 20 December 1972)

Day Three was to be, basically, a repeat of the previous two days, 99 B-52s in three waves, Wave I was directed to bomb Gia Lam with 6 B-52D, while the remaining 27 aircraft (15 Ds and 12 Gs) bombed the Yen Vien rail yard for the third night.  Wave II was slated to attack Gia Lam with two cells of B-52Gs (6 aircraft), and Bac Giang with another 6 G models, 15 (6 Gs and 9 Ds) more aircraft were to bomb the Thai Nguyen electrical plant.  Wave III sent 9 B-52Ds bombers to Gia Lam, yet again, 12 B-52Gs to Kinh No, 12 B-52Ds to the Hanoi Rail Yards, and 6 B-52Ds to hit Bac Giang a second time that night.  12 individual F-111A strikes were interspersed between the B-52 strikes throughout the night. Afternoon LORAN bombing from 52 F-4s and 20 A-7 were also called for.

Support for Day Three was 14 F-105G and 4 F-4C SAM suppression flights, 55 ecsort/CAP flights and 24 chaff flights.  Navy/USMC support would be in the form of 21 A-6s and 19 A-7s.

At 8:00 pm local (1300Z) the first cells of Wave I struck Gia Lam without incident and it looked like it was going to be another good night.  Then things went pear shaped.  B-52Gs Quilt 01 and Quilt 02 had ECM failures on the target run-in, just after bomb release and while in their PTT, Quilt 03, an unmodified aircraft, was struck by a SAM.  Capt Terry M. Galoneck, 1st Lt William Y. Arcuri, 1st LT Michael R Martini and SSgt Roy Madden ejected and were captured, it is not known if Capt Craig A. Paul and Capt Warren R. Spencer managed to eject or not, they were listed as Missing In Action until 1977.

The next two cells, Gold and Wine, made it without trouble; however, the unmodified B-52G, Brass 02, was also having trouble with their ECM gear and was also struck by a SAM while in the PTT.  Brass 02 managed to limp over the Thai border before the crew had to abandon the crippled aircraft.  The next cells were B-52D aircraft.  Snow and Grape cells bombed the target successfully.  In the next cell, Orange 03, was slammed by two SAMs just prior to bomb release, only 1st Lt. Paul L. Granger and Capt Thomas J. Klomann survived.  Maj John F. Stewart, Maj Randolph A. Perry, Capt. Irwin S. Lerner and CMSgt Arthur V. McLaughlin, Jr. are still listed as missing. 

An A-6A (Milestone 511) was hit by a SAM and when down over Cat Bi.  Cdr Gordon R. Nakagawa and Lt Kenneth H. Higdon both ejected and were captured.

The news of the night’s progress was being sent to General John C. Meyer Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, and one thing was becoming very obvious, the unmodified G models and aircraft with ECM degrades were vulnerable to SAMs, and worse, reducing the ECM protection of the entire cell.  The command was given to “Press on.”

But, even with this decision, plans were adjusted to minimize further losses, two cells of B-52G in Wave II were recalled just prior to crossing the 17th parallel (the last recall point), these were to have been sent “downtown” into the heavy SAM concentration around Hanoi to hit Gia Lam, which was hit already that night an due for more in Wave III, the lighter bomb load of the G’s meant that their absence would make little difference to the tonnage dropped on Gia Lam that night.  The remainder of Wave II was directed to targets to the northeast of Hanoi where the SAM coverage was weaker.  Wave 2 bombed their targets with no losses.

Unfortunately, for the G models in Wave III, recall was not an option, even though the targets were in the Hanoi SAM coverage area.  The entire bomber stream (12 aircraft) directed at the lucrative Kinh No complex were G models.  Worse the G’s committed to Wave III were a mix of modified and unmodified aircraft. 

At 5:05 am (2205Z), B-52D Straw 02, the second aircraft of the second cell in Wave III was hit by a SAM in its PTT, the aircraft attempted to recover to a friendly base in Thailand, but had to be abandoned over Laos.  The 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron successfully picked up all but the Radar Navigator, Maj Frank Gould.

The B-52G’s sent to bomb Kinh No ran into the expected trouble.  The lead bomber, Olive 01, took one SAM after weapons release, Only Lt Col James Nagahiro, Capt Lynn Beens and Lt Col Keith Heggen ejected, Capt Donovan Walters, Maj Edward Johnson, and A1C Charles Bebus did not survive the crash.  Unfortunately, Lt Col Heggen died of wounds while a POW.  Two cells back, Tan 03, was not having a good night, the bombing and navigational radar failed and while trying to calculate an accurate release point from information relayed from the Tan 02, Tan 03 drifted out of formation, and possibly out of the chaff corridor.  A SAM detonated underneath the bomber and it went in to a dive, as the Capt Randall Craddock and Capt George Lockhart, pilot and co-pilot, tried to regain altitude and get back on the bomb run a second SAM detonated next to the aircraft.  The pilots, Maj Bobby Kirby, 1st LT Charles Darr, and Capt Ronald Perry did not survive, only MSgt James Lollar managed to escape.  Both Olive 01 and Tan 03 were unmodified G models.

The remaining targets that night were bombed without loss.

The price for the night’s work had been high, the 307th SW and the 43rd BW had each lost a B-52D and the 72nd SW(P) had lost 4 B-52Gs, and the Navy had lost an A-6A, in addition, a B-52Ds had been damaged.  The facts were clear, all the G lost to date were unmodified G models, and most of the D models lost had had ECM degrades.  Unmodified and degraded ECM aircraft were a serious liability not only to themselves but to the entire cell.  Commanders at SAC HQ, 8th AF HQ, U-Tapao and Andersen had some serious thinking to do, and they had to do it before the next day.

Orders from the Joint Chief had just come down: the three day maximum effort had just become a sustained maximum effort.

[KogyBear]

Regrouping - Day Four (Thursday, 21 December 1972)

The required bombing effort for day four had been established prior to the launch of Day Three’s missions.  Fortunately, these requirements allowed for the use of only U-Tapao’s B-52Ds.  This was done to reduce the flight time and reduce maintenance requirements, not only of the bombers, but for the tankers that had to launch from Kadena AB in Okinawa and Clark AFB in the Philippines to support large bomber strikes from Andersen.  Andersen’s B52Gs were assigned relatively low SAM threat missions in support of Arc Light, which, incidentally, had been supported in addition to Linebacker II missions by both U-Tapao and Andersen.

The requirements were for a single wave of 30 bombers with each cell attack separated by 60 to 90 seconds instead of two minutes.  Commencing at 03:33 am local (0833Z) the first of two cells of B-52D were to bomb the Quang Te air field, followed by 4 cells hitting the Van Dien supply depot, and last, 4 cells were to hit the Bac Mai storage facility.  Prior to the B-52 attacks, 15 individual F-111A were scheduled starting at around 5:30 pm local (1030Z).

With the reduced B-52 strikes, the support package was similarly reduced 13 SAM suppression, 23 escort and 9 chaff flights were required.  Navy/USMC support amounted to 9 A-6s and 6 A-7s.

The reduced B-52 schedule was partially made up for in heavier and more pin-point fighter bombing that afternoon.  24 A-7Ds and 4 F-4s were to bomb Giap Nhi rail road yards, 12 F-4 against the Duc Noi rail yards, 4 F-4s with Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) were to knock out the Hanoi electrical power plant, 4 F-4 with LGBs to strike the Hanoi rail yards and 4 more F-4s with LGBs to knock out the Hanoi AM radio transmission station.  16 F-4s did a LORAN bomb run over the Trung Quang rail yard, with no observed results.

The B-52 sent this night used a different ingress and egress route than previous; ingress was still along from the southwest from Thailand and Loas and over “Thud Ridge” but egress was a straighter shot over the coast.  It was further dictated that egress should be “wet feet” over the Gulf of Tonkin.  Also, more of the detailed planning was delegated to “Arc Light” staff at Andersen.

The first loss of the evening was a Navy A-6A (Flying Ace 500), which was damaged by AAA over the Haiphong Port facilities and went down near Ken An air field.  Both pilot and BN were killed.

The first 18 B-52s struck their targets without a hitch.  Over Bac Mai, however, two of the big bombers ran into trouble.  In the lead cell, Scarlet 01 lead lost their radar, and with no one in front to feed target information, they could not bomb accurately.  They attempted to move from the lead position to trail position in the cell, but became separated and lost ECM coverage.  They were ineffectively engaged by a MiG-21, then after bomb release were struck by a SAM.  Capt Thomas Bennet, Lt Col Gerald Alley, and 1st LT Joseph Copack were killed; Capt Peter Giroux, Capt Peter Camerota and MSgt Louis LeBlanc managed to escape the crippled aircraft and were captured.  At the tail end of the bomber stream, Blue 01 was salvoed by as many as ten SAMs as they approached the release point.  As soon as bombs away was called, two SAMs detonated, one above the ****pit on the co-pilot’s side wounding Lt Col John Yuill, Lt Col Lou Bernacsoni, 1st LT William Mayall and Lt Col William Conlee and starting fires in the right wing.  The crew abandoned the aircraft Capt Dave Drummond and SSgt Gary Morgan as well as the others, became POWs.

New Targets, New Tactics - Day Five (Friday, 22 December 1972)

SAC and the Commands at U-Tapao and Andersen again reviewed the tactics they were using and the nature of the SAM threat.  It was decided that the high threat area of Hanoi would be avoided, for now.  The Haiphong rail yards and the Haiphong oil storage facility were the targets of day five.

The Haiphong rail yard would be hit by 12 B-52s and the oil storage facility would be hit with 18, all aircraft were from the 307th SW.  F-111A would perform precision night strikes in and around the Hanoi/Haiphong air fields and an afternoon strike of 34 F-4s and 24 A-7 would attempt LORAN guided bombing Viet Tri trans-shipment point and Bac Giang rail storage.

The B-52 stream would approach Haiphong from the Gulf of Tonkin to the south, with each cell on a separate track, with the track fanning out as they came north.  At approximately 60 miles south of Haiphong the ten individual cells would form six streams, but still none would be directed at any one particular target.  Three of the streams would feint due west as if headed for Hanoi.  At 30 south of Haiphong the six tracks would converge toward their assigned targets.  The exact spacing and timing was design so the bombers would converge on the Initial Point (IP) and as the turned to begin the bomb run the cells would be spaced approximately 75 seconds apart.  The PTT was to the north and back out over the gulf.

SAM support for the night was 4 F-105Gs, 6 F-4Cs and 5 F-4Es, another 27 F-4 would fly escort/CAP and 15 more F-4s for chaff dispersal.  The Navy provided more supports as the targets were closer to the carriers, in the form of 14 A-6s and 4 A-7s.

The attack went as planned and not one B-52 was damaged by SAM or AAA fire.  The quality and effectiveness of the Navy SAM suppression rated a personal compliment from CINCSAC.

F-111A (Jackel 33) was attacking the Hanoi port facilities that night, and took, what was believed to be a small arms round in the engine just after bomb release.  The engine was shut down and the crew attempted to continue egressing the target area at high mach.  Approximately 50 miles west of Hanoi the F-111 had enough and went down. The crew successfully separated from the aircraft in the escape module and made it safely to the ground.  The escape module landed in a relatively unpopulated and wooded area, so the downed crew had a chance to evade capture for a few days.

As a note, even though the B-52s at Andersen were not flying missions up north, they were not idle, on the 22nd of December 1972, 22 B-52Gs and 6 B-52D hit targets in support of Arc Light in the south.

Who is Sam Uplink? - Day Six (Saturday, 23 December 1972)

For the first time in the campaign SAM sites were to be the primary targets of B-52 strikes.  Three SAM sites, designated VN 660, VN 537 and VN 563, situated about 60 miles to the northeast of Hanoi were each to be attacked by 6 B-52D from Guam, while 18 B-52Ds from U-Tapao and 6 B-52Ds from Guam hit the Lang Dang rail center near the Chinese border.  Similar tactics as the night before were used with the cells fanning out prior to converging on the target.  An even dozen F-111A flights attacked their usual nightly targets.

Planned support was 7 F-105Gs, 6 F-4Cs and 5 F-4Es for SAM suppression, reduced CAP and chaff support (12 and 3 respectively) was due to fewer enemy assets that far north of Hanoi. USN/USMC support was 14 A-6s.

The tactic of attacking an active SAM site required some modification to the bomber formation, since the bombers would have to fly directly over the SAM site.  ECM protection of the bomber fails when the bomber passes in to the “burn-through” zone.  This is the radius where the ground based transmission signal surpasses the airborne ECM transmission signal and the ground radar can see through the ECM noise.  Since even mutual ECM protection was not possible in the “burn-through” zone, the cells split up and each aircraft in the cell striking a separate SAM site, and the second cell doing the same.  Observation of SAM activity indicated that NVA gunners used the first cell of a stream as a “pathfinder” for the flight path of subsequent cells, and even if jammed or suppressed by ARM missiles they could volley fire or home-on jam.  USAF tacticians hoped the SAM gunners would mistake the attacking bomber as the lead aircraft of the lead cell and just track his progress.  By the time the bombs hit, it would be too late to react. 

After bomb release the individual bombers, now separated, would have to rejoin and re-form their formations fro egress.  For maneuverable fighters in the day, this was no problem, but for a B-52, at night, this would be a test of skill.

Despite concerns and discussion amongst commanders on whether the risk was worth the results, when the MIGCAP and SAM suppression support forces reported they could not make their attacks on time prior to the arrival of the B-52s.  The B-52 attacks went as scheduled with no losses.
An EB-66C (Hunt 02) suffered engine failure and went down sometime that night.  A Marine F-4J (call sign unknown), escorting a photo reconnaissance flight was hit by AAA in the early evening.

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* The SA-2 Guideline is a command guided missile.  The ground station has two radars, one tracks the target, and the other tracks the missile.  The fire control computer calculates course corrections for the missile to achieve intercept and by radio link sends the course information to the missile (Uplink).  One of the active defenses was to deny the ground station from communicating with the missile by jamming the radio frequency (No-Uplink).
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Christmas Eve - Day Seven (Sunday, 24 December 1972)

For the third night in a row, the heavily defended Hanoi area was avoided by the BUFFs.  The planned missions were 12 B-52Ds were to hit the rail yard at Kep and 18 B-52Ds were to hit the rail yards at Thai Nguyen.  There would be only 3 F-111A flights against Kep, Phuc Yen and Yen Bai airfields just prior to the B-52 strikes.  Afternoon strikes of 30 F-4 using LORAN bombing techniques against the Bac Giang and Thai Nguyen trans-shipping points.

Sam suppression would come from 7 F-105Gs, 4 F-4Cs and 5 F-4Es, 22 F-4s would provide escort/CAP and an additional 16 F-4s would dispense chaff.  The Navy/USMC would provide minimal support from 3 A-6s, 2 A-7s and 4 F-4s.

The U-Tapao based B-52s would make a wide sweeping approach to the northwest, outside the SAM coverage area, skirt along the Chinese border duck inside the SAM coverage area to bomb their targets and return to the Chinese border to make their exit over the Gulf of Tonkin.  To further confuse enemy defenses the cells within the waves would not all make the same PTT to exit on slightly different tracks and rejoin further away from the target.

No B-52 received any SAM damage, but Purple 02 took a minor hit from AAA.  MiG-21 attempted to engage Black and Ruby cells, but inflicted no damage.  The tail gunner of B-52D 55-0083, Ruby 03, Airman First Class Albert Moore, was credited with one kill, the second, and last, MiG shot down by a tail gunner in the war.  (Probably, it will be the last aircraft to be shot down by defensive fire from a bomber in history.)
Another Navy A-7E (Battle Cry 314) on a SAM suppression sortie was downed by AAA.

Christmas day - (Monday, 25 December 1972)

No missions flown this day.

A Furious Return to Downtown - Day Eight (Tuesday, 26 December 1972)

Day Eight marked a return to massed strikes on targets in the high threat Hanoi area.  For the first time since Day One over one hundred B-52s would fly into North Vietnamese airspace.  But, this time there would be a major difference.  On the first three days of bombing, the three waves were separated by three to four hours, this night from the time of the first bomb release to the time of the last release was to be just 15 minutes.  This would also mark the return of flights  over North Vietnam by G model aircraft, however, all Gs would be those with the Rivet Rambler ECM modification kit.

The target list was:

Wave   Target         AircraftTOT (Zulu)   Assigned Cells            
I   Gia Lam Rail yards   B-52D   1530 - 1536    Snow, Slate, Cream
   Hanoi POL storage   B-52D   1538 - 1545   Lilac, Pinto, Cobalt
II   Thai Nguyen Rail Yard   B-52G   1530 - 1545   Opal, Lavender, Wine, Sable, Lemon, Walnut
III   VN 549 SAM Site      B-52D   1530   Rust
   Van Dien Supply Point   B-52D   1532 - 1545   Maroon, Amber, Silver, Red, Gold
IV   Giap Nhi Rail Yard   B-52D   1530 - 1545   Pink, White, Ivory, Yellow, Ebony, Smoke
V   Kinh No Complex      B-52D   1530 - 1535   Black, Ruby, Rainbow
   Duc Noi Rail Yard   B-52D   1537 - 1545   Indigo, Brown, Ash
VI   Haiphong Rail Yard   B-52G   1530 - 1542   Paint, Brick, Grape, Purple, Copper
VII   Haiphong Transformer Station   B-52G   1530 - 1542   Maple, Hazel, Aqua, Bronze, Violet

Due to the compression of aircraft, airspace and a desire to keep the North Vietnamese guessing, multiple ingress and egress routes were planed.  It also called for the use of multiple flight levels which had in the past pretty much been limited to 36,000 feet.

Black cell would lead Ruby, Rainbow, Indigo, Brown and Ash cells in from the west, turn southeast and fly along Thud Ridge to their targets in a fairly straightforward manner.  After the bomb run, they would turn to the northeast and exit along Snow cells ingress route.

Snow cell would lead Slate, Cream, Lilac, Pinto and Cobalt in from the east over Cam Pha, near the Chinese border, where they would separate into two diverging tracks until about 40 miles from the target then turn south and converge on the their two targets, a PTT to the northwest to avoid Pink cell then exit over Laos.

Pink cell would lead their stream in from Laos on almost a due north course then turn east toward Hanoi.  After the bomb run they would turn 90 degrees to the south and exit on the same track Rust had taken inbound.

Rust cell would lead Maroon cell and the following cells north over Nam Dinh turn directly toward their intended target then execute a 90 degree PTT to avoid both Pink and Snow streams the southwest also exiting over Laos.

Paint cell would parallel Snow cell’s track to the south, and over Cam Pha turn towards Haiphong and after bomb release turn 90 degrees to the southeast to avoid Maple cell and exit “wet feet.”  Maple cell would fly almost a reciprocal course to the Paint cell stream.

Opal cell’s stream would fly north from Thailand well to the west of the SAM coverage area, swing to the north of it and swoop down on Thai Nguyen.  Post target they would reverse course and exit along their own ingress route.

The plan of attack kept the weaker B-52Gs from the high threat “downtown” Hanoi area.

Three F-111A strikes on Lang Lau rail yards, Bac Giang rail yards and Viet Tri storage complex would occur about an hour before the B-52 strikes and 15 minutes prior to the B-52 arrival 4 F-111A attacks on the airfields of Yen Bai, Kep, Hoa Lac and Phuc Yen.  After B-52 bombers had left, three F-111A bomb runs would take place at Kep RR, Hanoi Radio and Bac Giang TSP to keep the enemy guessing about whether there would be more attacks that night.

Over 200 sorties were flown in support of the nights attacks. SAM suppression would be in the form of 9 F-105G, 4 F-4Cs and 5 F-4Es, 34 escort/CAP flights from F-4s and 23 F-4 chaff flights.  A further 10 A-6 and 11 A-7 came from the Navy.

That afternoon about an hour before the B-52s at Andersen took off the Hanoi electrical transformer station was bombed by 32 Air Force A-7D using LORAN aiming.  No results were observed.

At quarter after four (local, 0815Z) Andersen AFB was the site of the largest single B-52 launch in history.  78 combat loaded B-52s sat nose to tail along the taxi way.  The first B-52 roared off the runway at 1618 local (0816Z) and at 90 second intervals, for the next 2 hours bomber after bomber joined the long stream heading west.  To keep the runway at Andersen clear for uninterrupted takeoffs, aircraft experiencing problems were to divert to Agana Airport (the commercial airport for Guam) 60 miles to the south, one unfortunate Pan Am flight due in to Agana around 1600 requested landing instructions from Agana Approach Control only to be asked how much fuel he had on board, when he replied about 3-1/2 hours, he was told to remain in a holding pattern about 70 miles south of the island and expect a three hour delay, “for tactical considerations…”

At Kadena, the tanker support launch hit a snag when an inbound C-141 had a serious in-flight emergency this shut down the runway for about 20 minutes.  The tanker support for Wave III was going to be about 15 minutes late.  This threw the whole plan into jeopardy, not only from a tactical point of view, but since egress and ingress routes overlapped, mid-air collisions were highly likely.  The mission might have to be scrubbed.

The ABC for Wave III, Maj Tom Lebar and his navigators, Maj Vern Amundson and Capt Jim Strain calculated that if the refuel point was moved closer to the inbound tankers and modified their routing they might be able to catch up with Wave I and II.  Col James McCarthy acting as overall ABC in Wave I instructed Lebar to make the attempt, but if they could not be in position by the time Wave I crossed the 17 parallel, the mission would be scrubbed.  Just as Wave I began its turn north over the Gulf of Tonkin, Wave III joined up as scheduled.

It took about 45 minutes for a B-52 to cross the coast/border, make their bomb run, and exist to safe country, either the Gulf or Thailand.  The NVN had used the previous day off to good effect and the SAM sites had loaded up with missile and were freely expending them this night.  Once the entire force was committed to the attack, Col McCarthy the ABC, so he settled back in the jump seat and counted SAMs, he got to 26 before they started to come too fast to count.  MiG activity was also abundant.  In some cases MiG 21s would fly formation off the wing of a B-52 radioing altitude and heading information to SAM and AAA batteries, in others attempting to close within range to fire an Atoll missile, but breaking off went illuminated by a tail gunner’s radar. 

Over Gaip Nhi, Ebony 02 was hit by a SAM and exploded almost immediately, Col Michael H. Labeau, 1st Lt Robert M. Hudson, 1st Lt Duane P. Vavroch and TSgt James R. Cook escaped the aircraft and were captured, Capt Robert J. Morris, and Capt Nutter J. Wimbrow III, were killed.  About two minutes later Ash 01 had a SAM explode over the right wing knocking out the outboard pair of engines and wounding the tail gunner, losing altitude and struggling to maintain control it headed for the coast.  As Ash 01 approached U-Tapao, The crew decided to try and bring the plane in, because the wounded gunner might not be able to execute a bail out (no ejection seat) and the best course of action was to attempt to land the plane.  Ash 01 made it to U-Tapao, now with all four engines on the right side out, as it neared the runway, the aircraft veered to the right and the pilots added power in an attempt to go around.  The cripled bomber pitched up, stalled and crashed to the ground about a mile from the end of the active runway, killing Capt James M. Turner, Maj Lawrence J. Marshal, Lt Col Donald A. Joiner and Capt Roy T. Tabler.  Capt. Brent Diefenbach, a B-52 aircraft commander, was waiting in a crew bus, when he witnessed the crash.  He immediately jumped off the crew bus and commandeered a Thai bus to the crash.  He was the first to reached the crash and by that time the forward section of the fuselage was engulfed in flames.  Diefenbach heard someone inside the wreck.  Diefenbach entered the wreck following the crys for help.  He found the plane's co-pilot 1st Lt Robert J. Hymel, badly injured with one leg fractured and pinned under the twisted remains of the ****pit.  After a few minutes wrestling with the twisted remains of the aircraft, the injured co-pilot was free and Diefenbach dragged him from the wreckage as the firetruck and a helicopter arrived.  Hymel was airlifted to Clark AFB to recover.*  The gunner, TSgt Spencer L. Grippen, was pulled from his compartment in the tail, which had broken off from the rest of the aircraft when it impacted the ground.

All in all, the mission was a success. Nineteen targets were bombed and 231 sorties flown, at a cost of two B-52s.

Hanoi requested that the peace negotiations resume in Paris, Nixon's reponse was simply that the talks would resume on the January 2 1973, if Hanoi agreed, further bombing above the 20th parallel would cease.  There was no immediate response from Hanoi.

_______________________________________________
*September 11, 2001, Lt Col Hymel, Retired, was sitting at his desk as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst in the Pentagon.  He was killed in the attack.
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A Continuing Effort - Day Nine (Wednesday, 27 December 1972)

Both Ebony 02 and Ash 01 were part of incomplete cells.  In each case one of the three bombers in the cell had had mechanical trouble that required its return to base.  The orders were now that in the case of a bomber in a cell having to abort, the remaining bombers would join the cell to their front to form a five ship cell, this would keep the ECM jamming cover adequate to prevent any single ship to be “spot-lighted” by radar.

The plan for attack was a smaller scale version of the night before, except that it excluded Haiphong.  Only 60 aircraft were required for this night mission.  This time, the window of the attacks was compressed to 12 minutes, as there were fewer aircraft:

Wave   Target         AircraftTOT (Zulu)   Assigned Cells         
I   Lang Dang Rail Yard   B-52G   1600 - 1612   Beige, Cherry, Chrome, Chestnut, Opal, Gray, Cinnamon
II   VN 234 SAM Site      B-52D   1559      Ruby
   Duc Noi Rail Yard   B-52D   1603 - 1609   Wine, Amber, Black
III   Trung Quan Rail Yard   B-52D   1600 - 1609   Green, Cobalt, Topaz, Ivory
IV   VN 549 SAM Site      B-52D   1600      Lemon
V   VN 243 SAM Site      B-52D   1600      Ash
   Van Dien Supply Point   B-52D   1602 - 1609   Paint, Rainbow, Silver

The mission routes were simpler, with each route careful laid out to minimize the time spent in the SAM coverage area.

Ruby cell would lead Wine, Amber and Black in from the west, down Thud Ridge, making a straight in approach towards Doi Noi.  As Ruby cell passed over VN 234 SAM site in would dump its cargo of 324 bombs and continue to Duc Noi where the following three cells would unload, all would then head north towards the Chinese border.  Then as they cleared the SAM zone, they would turn back west and skirt around the western edge of the SAM zone and head South, them home.

Ash cell would lead Paint, Rainbow and Silver cells in from the southeast, as they crossed the coast, they would turn west and head straight in for Hanoi.  About 15 miles from the target, Ash would break off to attack VN 243, and post bomb release, rejoin the stream as they continued west over Laos and then south.

The Green cell would lead Cobalt, Topaz, Ivory, Beige, Cherry, Chrome, Chestnut, Opal, Gray and Cinnamon in from the Gulf north of Cam Pha, here, Green through Ivory would break off and head toward Thai Nguyen.  About twenty miles inland, Green would turn toward the target, at approximately 15 mile intervals each of the following cells would execute a similar dog leg.  Beige and the following cells would just go straight in bomb Lang Dang near the Chinese border, turn around and exit the way they came in.

Lemon cell would be the only cell to enter from Laos.  They would take the shortest route to their target, bomb it, and then take the shortest route to the Gulf.
SAM suppression was stepped up for the night, 14 F-105Gs, 4 F-4C and 5 F-4E.  The number of CAP/escort and chaff flights remained the same at 32 and 23 sorties.  Again the Navy was not heavily tasked, requiring to provide just 3 A-6s and an A-7.

Ash 02 was the first to encounter trouble.  They successfully bombed VN-243, crews in the following Paint cell reported at least one SA-2 was destroyed during its lift-off, and damage to the radar cause others in flight to go erratic.  Unfortunately, the exit route was very close to VN-549, which had gained a reputation as sharp-shooters.  Ash 02 was hit but managed to stay airborne long enough to make it over Laos where the crew bailed out, where they were all recovered.

Minutes later, Cobalt 01 was hit by a SAM seconds from bomb release.  Maj James Condon, the RN tried to execute weapons release as the passed over the target.  When this attempt failed Capt Frank Lewis ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft.  Maj Allen Johnson the EWO and 1st Lt Bennie Fryer both severely wounded by the SAM detonation did not make it out.  The others were captured.

Earlier that afternoon two F-4Es were shot down by MiG-21s in dogfights, both crews were taken prisoner.
Also, that afternoon the final chapter in the shoot down of F-111, Jackel 33, played out.  The previous day, after evading capture since the 22nd, Capt Sponeybarger (Jackel 33A) was captured, and the NVA intensified its search for Jackel 33B (1st Lt William Wilson).  A massive search and rescue mission was planned for the 27th of December.  Search elements made contact with Wilson and HH-53s where directed to his location.  The primary recovery aircraft HH-53C, 69-5788, Jolly Green 73, located Wilson and began recovery operations.  As the jungle penetrator was being lowered, the helicopter started to take small arm fire from NVA troops.  The refueling probe was shot up and the co-pilot wounded, but remained in a hover as Wilson attempted to grab the penetrator.  Weakened by being on the run for four days, Wilson lost his balance and rolled down the hill away from the helicopter.  Unable to remain, due to increasingly accurate fire, the Jolly Greens had to break off the attempt.  Unable to take on fuel due to the damaged refuel probe, JG 73 set down in a clearing inside the Laos border.  A second HH-53 (Jolly Green 63) landed and picked up the crew, including Capt Miguel Dereira with a broken arm.  A third helicopter (Jolly Green 54) attempted to recover classified documents and equipment, but enemy fire drove them off.  A Sandy A-7 was called in to destroy the helicopter with bombs to prevent its capture.

Wilson managed to evade capture for two more days, but while attempting to recover a food and water packet dropped by orbiting A-7 Sandys, he was captured.

More Strikes Downtown - Day Ten (Thursday, 28 December 1972)

Tactics continued to evolve.  The spacing of aircraft within the cell was further decreased; pilots flew close enough to the aircraft to their front that they could see the glow of the engine exhaust.  The eight “lights” strung out in a line formed an articifial horizon and allowed for the aircraft to coordinate turns by keeping their wings level with the line formed by the row engines.  Also, the tactic of varying the time between bomb release and the start of the PTT, while good at throwing off the aim of enemy gunners, it had the adverse effect of destroying cell integrity, and mutual ECM support through cell integrity was far more important in preventing successful SAM engagements.

Wave   Target         Aircraft TOT (Zulu)   Assigned Cells      
I   Lang Dang Rail Yard   B-52G   1515 - 1539   Snow, Brown, Lilac, Bronze
II   Lang Dang Rail Yard   B-52D   1531 - 1539   Smoke, Orange, Quilt, Violet (G)
III   SAM Support Fac 58   B-52D   1515 - 1523   Plaid, Sable, Brass
IV   Duc Noi Rail Yard      1515 - 1523    White, Red, Rust
VI   VN 158 SAM Site      B-52D   1515      Pinto
   Duc Noi Rail Yard   B-52D   1519 - 1523   Gold, Indigo
V   VN 266 SAM Site      B-52D   1515      Hazel
   Duc Noi Rail Yard      1519 - 1523   Peach, Yellow

Two additional changes in tactics were introduced. The first was the simultaneous bombing of a target by two separate bomber streams.  At Duc Noi Gold and Indigo would approach from the south, while Hazel (empty having dropped its bombs earlier on VN 266), Peach and Yellow would approach from the west, Gold and Peach would arrive at the target at the same time.  Using the fact that a bomb dropped from 36,000 feet from an aircraft traveling 450 knots will continue forward, as it drops, about 5 miles before ground impact, two bomber streams could release bombs and make an immediate 90 degree turn away from each other and still maintain 5 or 6 seven miles separation, the two streams were further fragged* at different altitudes, to increase safety.  Similarly, Plaid and White cells were to bomb SAM support Facility 58 simultaneously, except Plaid’s stream would continue in a straight line over the target while White would turn through about 100 degrees to a course slightly divergent from Plaid’s course.

The second new tactic was used in the attack on Lang Dang, Snow cell would approach Lang dang from the south east, bomb the target and make a wide turn to the south and exit on a track parallel to the approach track, Smoke cell would approach the target on a reciprocal course to Snow, bomb, and exit directly on Snow’s approach track.  A ten minute gap between the departure of Bronze cell and the arrival of Smoke cell ensured the two streams did not become entangled.

Navy support was slightly heavier, they flew 14 A-6, 6 A-7 and 2 F-4 sorties that night while USAF SAM suppression support was scaled back, with 7 SAM flights sorties, the escort/CAP and chaff sorties were 28 and 23 respectively. 

Fourteen F-111 sorties were launched against 6 SAM sites, airfields in the Hanoi area, Bac Giang rail yard, Thai Nguyen electrical power station and Viet Tri.  The F-111 missions were timed to commence about two hours prior to the B-52 attacks, and finish about 3 hours after the last b-52 attack.  A further 44 A-7 and F-4 visual/LORAN bombing sorties were sent out in the early afternoon, some damage was observed in these strikes.

 The only loss of the day was a US Navy RA-5C (Flint River 603), shot down by a MiG-21.  The pilot, CDR Alfred Agnew ejected and was captured, his Radar Attack Navigator (RAN), LT Michael Haifly is still listed as missing.

The End?- Day Eleven (Friday, 29 December 1972)

The weather during the entire period had been marginal at best, and the daylight attacks on SAM sites and SAM storage facilities had not inflicted the damage desired by higher command.  With fewer other targets to hit, the B-52 were taking on more of the SAM support and missile storage facilities.  The night’s targets were:

Wave   Target            Aircraft TOT (Zulu)   Assigned Cells      
I   Lang Dang Rail Yard      B-52G   1620 - 1624   Paint, Black, Lemon
II   Lang Dang Rail Yard      B-52D   1634 - 1638   Chrome, Cinnamon, Cherry
III   Trai Ca SAM Storage Facility   B-52D   1636 - 1644   Opal, Beige, Ivory, Topaz, Gray
IV   Phuc Yen SAM Storage Facility   B-52D   1620 - 1626   Aqua, Walnut, Wine
V   Phuc Yen SAM Storage Facility   B-52D   1620 - 1626   Red, Rainbow, Green
VI   Phuc Yen SAM Storage Facility   B-52D   1620 - 1626   Grape, Maple, Chestnut

The attack on Lang Dang was almost a carbon copy of the previous night, except the ten minute window was eliminated and Lemon and Chrome would have the same TOT.

The attack on Trai Ca was a fairly simple affair, as the stream would come in from the northwest, drop their bombs, make a slight shift to the north to avoid Grape, exiting the same direction and out over the Gulf.

The attack on Phuc Yen was complicated and required skilled pilots, Navigators and Radar Navigators (bombardiers).  Three bomber streams, coming from three different directions, at three different altitudes, would all over fly the target, and put all their bombs on target at the same time.  Red cell would lead their stream in from the west; fly straight over Phuc Yen, then 30 miles after release turn to the northwest and exit around the SAM coverage area.  Aqua would fly in from the Gulf of Tonkin, on a straight line course that would take over the target and over Laos and then Thailand, Walnut cell would make a diversionary dogleg to the south before rejoining the stream over the target.  Grape would come in down Thud Ridge with Maple cell doglegging to the north, then over the target, Grape stream would turn on the reciprocal course of Aqua stream, and egress directly over their ingress route.

The maneuver required precision in the timing of the bomb release as it required the higher group’s bombs to be underneath the lower groups by the time their paths crossed. 

One F-111A was sent to attack Kep (1540Z), Hoa Lac (1622Z) and Yen Bai (1543Z) air fields, and two separated attacks on SAM sites (1553Z and 1551Z).

Supports was in the form of 12 SAM, 33 CAP/escort and 25 chaff sorties.  The Navy provided  9 A-6, 3 A-7 and 2 F-4s sorties.

Wine 03 had a refuel receptacle problem and could not take on fuel and had to drop out and return to Andersen, Wine 01 and 02 moved forward and joined formation with Walnut cell, forming a five ship cell without difficulty.  Other than Wine 03’s abort, the mission went as planned, with no losses or damage for the second night.

At 2343 local (1643Z) Gray 03 released bombs over Trai Ca and headed from the Gulf of Tonkin, this was the last time a B-52 would venture north of the 20th parallel to bomb North Vietnam, Hanoi had agreed to the 2 January resumption of talks.

[KogyBear]

Conclusions and Thoughts.

"There was a deadlock in the middle of December, and there was rapid movement when negotiations resumed ... These facts have to be analyzed by each person for himself." Dr Henry Kissinger

It is easy to assess the physical accomplishments of the campaign: 500 rail interdictions had taken place, 372 pieces of rolling stock and three million gallons of petroleum products were destroyed, 80 percent of North Vietnam's electrical power production capability had been eliminated, rail and port facilities were so damaged that imports of military equipment and other products dropped from and estimated 160,000 tons per month to 30,000 ton per month.  Judging by the number of SAMs fired during the last few days of the campaign, the NVN were running short and it was unlikely that they could be resupplied quickly. 

Linebacker II accomplished its primary political goal of bringing the NVN back to the table a Paris, by the end of the month the Paris Peace Accords were signed at the Majestic Hotel in Paris. That would end US involvement in South Vietnam.  This peace treaty would secure the release of US PoWs held in North Vietnam, which had been a sticky point, as the NVN not wanted to discuss them in conjunction with US withdrawal, but to hold them as a bargaining chip for additional concessions.  As to the out come of the conflict in the greater sense, that had been decided much earlier, when the decision was made in favor of “Vietnamization” back in 1969, and Linebacker and Linebacker II had no impact on that.  Due to Congressional opposition, Nixon was in no position to "respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam," as he had promised the South Vietnamese Government, since there was ablsolutely no possibility of obtaining the requisite congressional appropriations.  Nor, did Linebacker II have any influence on the nature of the agreement between the US and Hanoi, the signed treaty was pretty much the same as had been agreed to, in principle, back in October.

SAC as, by some, been criticized by some for not reacting quickly to the combat losses of the B-52 during Linebacker II, but examination of the facts shows this not to be entirely the case.  The first days losses while heavy, in both aircraft and crews, three lost and four damaged, were considered “acceptable”, and the second day there were none, so what they were doing appeared to be correct.  By the time the first wave of day three got plastered, the decisions were made, and made very quickly.  One must also consider that the long duration of the missions and the pace of operations did not allow for a complete de-brief of the returning crews before the next days launch, which induced a lag between what happened and implementing corrective measures.   The vulnerability of the G models is an example of this lag. 

Further, the tactics used in the last phase of the campaign (Day 8 as after) could not have been performed in the early stages of the campaign, the experience in handling large formations of not very maneuverable bombers gained in the first few days allowed for the refinements used later on.  It is only through hindsight that the first three days seem badly managed.  Also, it has been said that the routes used in the first three days were exactly the same, allowing the NVN gunners to accurately predict where to shoot.  This also is not entirely true.  The general direction and general maneuvering over the targets were the same but the actual headings and timings were sufficiently different as the actual targets were different.

A second charge against SAC was the planning of the missions was to far removed for the theater (the first three days were planned entirely from SAC HQ in Omaha), one, this ignores the political reality existent at the time.  Concern over collateral damage was paramount.  As the campaign progressed, more and more of the detail planning was transferred to ARC Light Center at Andersen. 

There have been, over the years arguments and counter-arguments about what the loss rate was and whether it was really sustainable or not.  And, like most statistics arguments there is no absolutely correct answer, just variations on how you arrange the statistics.

There were 729 sorties flown and 15 aircraft lost, the official Air Force tally is 2%.  Broken down by Model, The d Model flew 513 sorties and lost 9 aircraft, or 1.7%, The Gs flew 228 sorties and lost 6, or 2.6%

But, there are other ways to cut the cake.  There were a total of 107 B-52Ds and 99 B-52Gs available at Andersen and U-Tapao on 18 December 1972, at the end of the campaign there were 98 Ds and 93 Gs, respectively, they suffered a loss rate of 8.4% and 6.1%.  In the larger view, there were 143 D models, 180 G models and 30 F models in the entire USAF inventory.  These were no longer the primary nuclear deterrent, at least the D’s and F’s were most certainly not.  The USAF chose the D for “Big Belly” conversions because they were no longer required for nuclear alert, and had not the war intervened, would have been sent to 3040th Aircraft Storage Depot (“the Boneyard” now 309th AMARG) along with the 159 B-52Es and B-52Fs that were retired in the late 1960s.  For the entire B-52 fleet available in 1972, 3.3% were lost during Linebacker II.

The USAF had 66 additional B-52D and Fs that were not really a nuclear deterrent available should they be required, in addition, of the 160 B-52s at Davis-Monthan all had been retired between 1966 at 1970, and could have been returned to service.  So push came to shove there were plenty of B-52s to drop bombs, at least then.

One of the most alarming things that came out of this campaign was the relative weakness of the G model compared to the D.  Twenty-four B-52s were hit by SAM missiles, of those 10 managed to fly back to a friendly base (one crashed on the approach), of that ten, only one was a G model. It is possible that the changes made to the G models in order to lighten the airframe and improve the range had a detrimental effect on the ability to withstand battle damge.  The major change to the wing was the introduction of three integral fuel tanks which replaced the rubber bladder-type tanks in the wings of previous versions. This called for a complete structural redesign.   

A total of 2679 combat sorties were flown north of the 20th Parallel during the 12 day period from 18 to 29 December 1972.

884 night bombing sorties:

741 B-52, 12 sorties were aborted, for an operational rate of 98.3%

143 F-111A

769 night support sorties:

99 F-105G SAM suppression

40 F-4C SAM suppression

31 F-4E SAM suppression

390 F-4 escort/CAP

209 F-4 chaff

496 day bombing sorties. (4 sorties were F-4 pathfinder, no ordnance):

258 F-4
   
264 A-7

530 day support sorties:

64 F-105G SAM suppression

62 F-4 SAM suppression

273 F-4 escort/CAP

85 F-4 chaff

16 miscellaneous F-4

30 miscellaneous A-7

B-52 Crew Arrangements

Crew positions on the B-52D were: in the forward crew compartment, the Pilot and Co-pilot sat on the upper deck with upward ejection seats, the Radar Navigator and the Navigator sat on the lower deck in downward ejection seats, the Electronics Warfare Officer sat on the upper deck centerline behind the pilots with an forward facing upward ejection seat.  In addition, there were four jump seats for additional crew/observers, one of which was aft and between two pilots (the toilet, which was  fitted with a cushion and seat straps, double as one spare seat).  In the event of an emergency, those without ejection seats would have to execute a manual bailout.  A manual bailout from the forward compartment was done by waiting until the RN or Nav ejected, leaving two large holes in the compartment floor, then dropping through one of the holes, or opening the entry hatch and exiting through that.

The tail gunner was in the rear compartment at the tail of the aircraft; this was fitted with a canopy for visual scanning of the rear quadrant and had its own small toilet, which also doubled as an observer seat.  Entry was gained through either a door and access ladder just forward of the compartment pressure bulkhead, or by a catwalk that lead through the bombay to the forward compartment which could only be used when the aircraft was unpressurized. For emergency egress, the gunner could use either of the two entrances, or could jettison everything aft of the rear pressure bulkhead (the gun turret/radar director) and jump out the back of the aircraft.  The tail position was very small and cramped, the gunner had to recline the seat back flat and crawl over it for normal entry.
The layout for the B-52G was similar, except the rear compartment was eliminated and the gunner was moved to the forward compartment next to the EWO, both now faced aft with upward ejection seats.  There were at least three jump seats for observers/instructors, one between the pilots as in the D model.  The move forward by the gunner improved his quality of life as he was no longer isolated, and cramped, and the ride was much improved as tail end of the aircraft could get tossed about, especially in turbulence, but some though the loss of a pair of eyes I the six o’clock quadrant was a serious loss.

Neither model had a galley, or even a hot plate (or a safe, as seen in “Dr Strangelove”) so for long duration flights boxes meals were provided.  (On the first day on the campaign, Andersen’s mess halls had to provide around 1650 such boxed meals).
 
Linebacker II Losses

26 aircraft were lost in combat, 9 B-52Ds, 6 B-52Gs, 3 F-4s, 2 F-111As 2 A-6s, 2 A-7s, 1 RA-5C, and 1 HH-53.  An additional aircraft, an EB-66 was lost due to engine failure.

Time   Type   Serial/BuNo   Call Sign   Unit   Cause   Target   Notes:   Status   

18 Dec 1972
1300Z   F111A (A1-144)   67-0099    Snug 40   430th TFS/474th TFW   unk   Hanoi Radio   
Lt Col Ronald J Ward (P)    MIA
Maj James R. McElvan (WSO)    MIA

1317Z   B-52G-100-BW   58-0201   Charcoal 01   72nd SW   SA-2    Yen Vien   
Lt Col Donald L. Rissi (PC)    KIA
1st Lt Robert J. Thomas (P)   KIA
Maj Richard E. Johnson (RN)   PoW
Capt Robert G. Certain (N)   PoW
Capt Richard T. Simpson (EWO)   PoW   
TSgt Walter L. Ferguson (G)   KIA

1701Z   B-52G-110-BW   58-0246   Peach 02   72nd SW   SA-2    Yen Vien    
Maj Clifford B. Ashley (PC)    Rec
Capt Gary L. Vickers (P)   Rec
Maj Archie C. Myers (RN)   Rec
Capt Forrest E. Stegelin (N)   Rec
Capt James T. Tramel (EWO)   Rec
MSgt Kenneth E. Conner (G)   Rec
Lt Col Hendsley R. Conner (DABC)   Rec   

2200Z   A-7C-3-CV   156783 (AJ303)   Street Car 303   VA-82 (USS America)   SA-2   (Iron Hand)   
LT Carl T. Weiland (P)   PoW

2205Z   B-52D-75-BO   56-0608   Rose 01   307th SW    SA-2  Hanoi Radio    
Capt Hal K. Wilson (PC)    PoW
Capt Charles A. Brown (P)   PoW
Maj Fernando Alexander (RN)   PoW
Capt Richard W. Cooper (N)   KIA
Capt Henry C. Barrows (EWO)   PoW
TSgt Charlie S. Poole (G)   KIA   

20 Dec 1972
1310Z   B-52G-85-BW   57-6496    Quilt 03   43rd BW   SA-2    Yen Vien   
Capt Terry M. Geloneck (PC)    PoW
1st Lt William Y. Arcuri (P)   PoW
Capt Warren R. Spencer (RN)   KIA
1st Lt Michael R. Martini (N)   PoW
Capt Craig A. Paul (EWO)   KIA
SSgt Roy madden (G)   PoW   

1321Z   B-52G-80-BW   57-6481   Brass 02   72nd SW   SA-2    Yen Vien   
Capt John D. Ellinger (PC)    Rec
Capt Lawrence A. Casazza (P)   Rec
Maj Charles E. Archie (RN)   Rec
1st Lt Robert A. Clement (N)   Rec
Capt Silverio A. Barroqueiro (EWO)   Rec
TSgt George H. Schryer (G)   Rec

1332Z   B-52D-80-BO   56-0622   Orange 03   72nd SW   SA-2    Yen Vien   
Maj John F. Stuart (PC)    KIA
1st Lt Paul L. Granger (P)   PoW
Maj Randolph A. Perry, Jr. (RN)   KIA
Capt Thomas Klomann (N)   PoW
Capt Irwin S. Lerner (EWO)   KIA
MSgt Arthur McLaughlin (G)   MIA

1656Z   A-6A (I-330)   15594 (NK511)   Milestone 511   VA-196 (USS Enterprise)   SA-2    Cat Bi Airfield   CDR Gordon R. Nakagawa (P)   PoW
LT Kenneth H. Higdon (BN)   PoW

2205Z   B-52D-35-BW   56-0669   Straw 02   43rd BW   SA-2    Gia Lam Rail yard   
Capt Deverl H. Johnson (PC)    Rec
1st Lt James T. Farmer (P)   Rec
Maj Frank A. Gould (RN)   MIA
Capt Vincent F. Russo (N)   Rec
Capt Paul J. Fairbanks (EWO)   Rec
TSgt. James R. Barclift (G)   Rec
2213Z   B-52G-100-BW   58-0198   Olive 01   72nd SW   SA-2    Kinh No   
Lt Col James Y. Nagahiro (PC)    PoW
Capt Donovan K Walters (P)   KIA
Maj Edward H. Johnson (RN)   KIA
Capt Lynn R. Beens (N)   PoW
Capt Robert R. Lynn (EWO)   KIA
A1C Charles J Bebus (G)   KIA
Lt Col Keith R. Heggen (DABC)   POW*

2219Z   B-52G-95-BW   58-0169   Tan 03   72nd SW   SA-2    Kinh No   
Capt Randall J. Craddock (PC)    KIA
Capt George B. Lockhart (P)   KIA
Maj Bobby A. Kirby (RN)   KIA
1st Lt Charles E. Darr (N)   KIA
Capt Ronald D. Perry (EWO)   KI      
SSgt. James L. Lollar (G)   PoW

21 December 1972
1110Z   A-6A (I-250)   152946 (AC500)   Flying Ace 500   VA-75 (USS America)   AAA   Haiphong Port Facilities    
LTCDR. Robert S. Graustein (P)   KIA
LTCDR Barton Wade (BN)   KIA

2045Z   B-52D-15-BW   55-0061   Scarlet 03   307th SW    SA-2   Bac Mai   
Capt Peter J. Giroux (PC)   PoW
Capt Thomas W. Bennett, Jr. (P)   KIA
Lt Col Gerald W. Alley (RN)   KIA
1st Lt. Joe Copack, Jr. (N)   KiA
Capt Peter P. Camerota (EWC)   PoW
MSgt. Louis L. LeBlanc (G)   PoW

2046Z   B-52D-1-BW   55-0050   Blue 01   307th SW    SA-2    Bac Mai    
Lt Col John H. Yuill (PC)   PoW
Capt David L. Drummond (P)   PoW
Lt Col Louis H. Bernasconi (RN)   PoW
1st Lt William T. Mayall (N)   PoW
Lt Col William W. Conlee (EWO)   PoW
SSgt Gary L. Morgan (G)   PoW

22 December 1962
1438Z F-111A (A1-113)   67-0068   Jackel 33   429th TFS/474th TFW   unk   Hanoi Port Facilities   
Capt Robert D. Sponetbarger (P)   PoW
1st Lt William W. Wilson (WSO)   PoW

23 December 1972
    ?   EB-66E-DL   54-0529   Hunt 02   42nd TEWS/388th TFW   Eng Fail   ECM Support   
Maj George F. Sasser (P)   KIA
Capt William R. Balwin (N)   KIA
Maj Henry J. Repeta (EWO)   KIA

0903Z   F-4J-32-MC   153885   unk   VMFA-333 (USS America)   AAA   Photo Escort   
Lt Col John K. Cochran (P)   Rec
Maj H. S. Carr (RIO)    Rec

24 December 1972
0402Z   A-7E-7-CV   157503 (NE314)   Battle Cry 314   VA-113 (USS Ranger)   AAA   (Iron Hand)   
LT Philip S. Clark, Jr. (P)   KIA

26 December 1972
1542Z   B-52D-35-BW   56-0674   Ebony 02   307th SW    SA-2    Giap Nhi   
Capt Robert J. Morris, Jr. (PC)   KIA
Rail yard   1st Lt Robert M. Hudson (P)   PoW
Capt Michael H. LaBeau (RN)   PoW
1st Lt Duane P Vavroch (N)   PoW
Maj Nutter J. Wimbrow, III (EWO)   KIA
TSgt James R. Cook (G)    PoW

1544Z   B-52D-70-BO   56-0584   Ash 01   307th SW    SA-2     Kinh No   
Capt James M. Turner (PC)   KIA
1st Lt Robert J. Hymel (P)   Rec
Lt Col Donald A. Joyner (RN)   KIA
Maj Lawrence J. Marshall (N)   KIA
Capt Roy T. Tabler (EWO)   KIA
TSgt. Spencer L. Grippin (G)   Rec

27 December 1972
0630Z   F-4E-35-MC   67-0292   DeSoto 03   13th TFS/432nd TRW   MiG-21   (Strike Ecsort)   
Maj Carl H. Jeffcoat (P)   PoW
1st Lt Jack R. Trimble (WSO)   PoW

0646Z   F-4E-34-MC   67-0234   Vega 02   4th TFS/432nd TRW   MiG-21   (MIGCAP)   
Capt John W. Anderson (P)   PoW
1st Lt Brian H. Ward (WSO)   PoW

0830Z   HH-53C (65-243)   69-5788   Jolly Green 73   40th ARRS   Small Arms   (Rescue)   
Capt Richard D. Shapiro (PC)   Rec
Capt Miguel A. Pereira (P)   Rec
Sgt Charles J. Rouhier (FE)   Rec
TSgt John R. Carlson (PJ)   Rec
A1C Robert W. Jones (PJ)   Rec
Sgt James W. ****rill (Pht)   Rec

1600Z   B-52D-75-BO   56-0599   Ash 02   307th SW   SA-2   VN-243 SAM site   
Capt John Mize (PC)   Rec
Capt Terrence J. Gruters (P)   Rec
Capt William E. North (RN)   Rec
1st Lt William L. Robinson (N)   Rec
Capt Dennis W. Anderson (EWO)   Rec
TSgt. Peter E. Whalen (G)   Rec

1603Z   B-52D-75-BO   56-0605   Cobalt 02   43rd BW   SA-2   Truang Quan Rail yards
Capt Frank D. Lewis (PC)   PoW
Capt Samuel B. Cusimano (P)   PoW
Maj James C. Condon (RN)   PoW
1st Lt Ben L. Fryer (N)   KIA
Maj Allen L. Johnson (EWO)   KIA
MSgt James C. Gough (G)   POW

28 December1972
0415Z   RA-5C (NA283-36)   151632 (NK603)   Flint River 603   RVAH-13 (USS Enterprise)   MiG-21   (Photo Recon)   
LTCDR  Alfred H. Agnew (P)   PoW
LT Michael F Haifly (RAN)   MIA

Notes:
1. Since these missions lasted from early afternoon to the early morning the next day, fixing the date often leads to confusion, some sources listing the date of the occurrence, others listing the date the aircraft started its mission.  The dates given here are taken from the ZULU date/time information of time of the occurrence, when done this way the dates do not spill over at 0001 local.
2. Crew positions are listed in parenthesis after the name:

BN - Bomber/Navigator
DABC - Deputy Airborne Commander
EWO - Electronics Warfare Officer
G - Gunner
FE - Flight Engineer
N - Navigator
P - Pilot
PC - Pilot, Commanding
PHT - Photographer
PJ - Pararescue Jumper
RAN - Radar Attack Navigator
RN - Radar Navigator
RIO - Radar Intercept Officer
WSO - Weason Systems Officer

3. Listed in the last column is the last status available as of the publishing of this article.

PoW - Recorded as taken prisoner and returned (* indicates died in captivity).
Rec - Successfully recovered from crash or ejection.
KIA - Killed, remains returned to the US.
MIA - Still listed as missing.

B-52s Damaged in Linebacker II (18 - 29 December 1972)

Type   Serial No   Call Sign   Unit   Cause   Notes:   

18 December 1972
B-52D-35-BW   56-0678   Lilac 03   43rd BW   SA-2   Recovered to U-Tapao.  No inspar wing damage, 350 external holes in 24 areas require repair
               kits.  Approximately 60,000 manhours.  Returned to service 30 July 1973
B-52D-70-BO   560583   Rainbow 01   43rd BW   SA-2   Repaired IAW T.O. 1-B-52B-3, 53 manhours, 10 external holes and several dents. 
               Returned to service 12-20-72
B-52D-75-BO   56-0592       ?   43rd BW   SA-2   Landed at Nam Phong. One-time flight to U-Tapao for permanent repairs on 23 December 1972.
               2000 manhours.  Returned to service 15 March 1972
B-52G-115-BW   58-0254   Hazel 03   72nd SW   SA-2      Landed at Andersen AFB. Sheet metal damage to the top of the fuselage 30 to 50 holes
               repaired IAW T.O. 1-B-52B-3.  This was the only B-52G to take missile damage and not crash.
21 December 1972
B-52D-20-BW   55-0067   Brick 02   307th SW   SA-2   Landed at U-Tapao.  19 external holes.  Repaired IAW T.O 1-B52B-3. 
               Returned to service 9 Janurary 1973.
24 December 1972
B-52D-1-BW   55-0051   Purple 02   307th SW   SA-2   Landed at U-Tapao.  Eleven external holes. 226 manhours.  Returned to service 9 January 1973.

26 December 1972
B-52D-15-BW   55-0062   Cream 01   43rd BW   SA-2   Landed at Andersen AFB.  Repaired IAW T.O. 1-B-52B-3. Returned to service 27 December 1972
B-52D-60-BO   55-0090   Cream 02   43rd BW   SA-2   Landed at Andersen AFB.  Repaired IAW T.O. 1-B-52B-3. Returned to service 28 December 1972
B-52D-80-BO   56-0629   Black 03   307th SW   SA-2   Landed at U-Tapao.  14 external holes and three dents.  63 manhours.  Returned to service 31
               December 1972

Rivet Rambler - Phase V Electronic Countermeasures Kit:

1 each   AN/ALR-18   Threat Detection Receiver (General Electric)
1 each   AN/ALR-20   Panoramic Countermeasure Radar Warning Receiver (Tasker)
4 each   AN/ALT-6B   Multi-band Jammer
   -or-
   AN/ALT-22   Continuous Wave Jamming Transmitter (GE, Burrows, Litton)
2 each   AN/ALT-16   D-Band Noise Barrage Jammer (Hallicrafters, Litton)
2 each   AN/ALT32H   Communications Jammer - High Band (Northrop)
1 each   AN/ALT-32L   Communications Jammer - Low Band (Northrop)
1 each   AN/APR-25   S/X/C Band Radar Detection and Homing Set (Itek)
6 each   AN/ALE-20   Infrared Flare Dispenser - 96 Flares total (Various)
8 each   AN/ALE-24   Chaff Dispenser - 1125 Chaff Bundles (Lundy)

Some B-52Gs were fitted with an AN/ALE-25 Decoy Rocket Pod with ADR-8A Decoy Rockets
Some B-52Gs were fitted with an AN/ALQ-119 “Compass Tie”/”Compass Matrix”/”Seek Ice” S/X/C Band Noise/Deception Jamming Pod (Westinghouse)